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Abstract
Expansion of the Medicaid program was a crucial component of the 2010 Affordable
Care Act (ACA). This expansion was intended to allow individuals with incomes up to 138% of
the federal poverty level to be eligible for their state’s Medicaid program, with most of the
requisite funding coming from the federal government. While the program was originally
designed to apply to all states, in 2012 the Supreme Court allowed states to decide whether and
when they wished to participate in the expansion, resulting in a natural experiment of state based
health policy making. To date, 19 states have yet to adopt the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.
Cross-sectional studies have previously been used to examine the determinants of expansion
decisions. Many of these studies have concluded that political factors are the key drivers of
expansion decisions (Barilleaux and Rainey, 2014). More recent studies, however, contend that
factors related to state-need are of greater importance (Henley, 2016). Using a discrete-time-logit
model of state conditions and decisions from 2012 to 2016, this study addresses the disagreement
found in the literature and permits the introduction of time varying covariates into the study of
expansion decisions. Results of this work indicate that when expansion decisions are examined
over time, the odds of expanding Medicaid with a Republican governor are found to be roughly a
tenth of what they are with a Democratic governor. Further, factors related to state-need fail to
achieve statistical significance. Evidence of a “regional diffusion” effect for Medicaid
expansions is also uncovered, with the odds of a state expanding in a given time-step being
doubled for each standard deviation increase in the percentage of states within its census region
having previously expanded. These findings improve our understanding of what factors may
prompt future adoptions of the Medicaid expansion and highlight the tensions that often exist
between federal and state actors.
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Introduction
Since the turn of the 20th century, attempts at fundamentally altering the system of
healthcare delivery and finance in the United States have been routinely met with
insurmountable opposition (Starr, 1982). There have been some rare instances of success,
however, of significant policy change. The establishment of Medicaid in 1965 serves as one such
example.
Medicaid is an important public health program dedicated to improving access to
healthcare among low-income and medically needy individuals (Engel, 2006). Over the last 50
years, the program has transformed how the poor and disabled access the US health system. Due
to Medicaid’s unique administrative structure, however, this transformation has not been
consistent across the country (ibid). Although the federal government provides critical oversight
and funding, states have a high degree of policy autonomy in determining benefit and eligibility
rules. This administrative structure has created a policy-making environment that has contributed
to wide variations in the Medicaid programs offered by each of the states (Artiga, 2017).
The challenge presented by this federal-state partnership was highlighted by the
implementation of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) Medicaid
expansion. Among its many reforms to the health system, the ACA proposed replacing all statebased Medicaid eligibility criteria with a simple income-based criterion. Under the ACA’s
proposal, all individuals making below 138% of the federal poverty line (approximately $16,600)
would be eligible for Medicaid through their state’s program. This would be the single largest
expansion of coverage in the history of the Medicaid program and was a key component of the
ACA’s larger aim of reducing the overall uninsured rate (Garfield, 2016).
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In order to compel state governments to agree to the expansion, the federal government
attempted to condition the entirety of a state’s federal Medicaid funding upon their acceptance of
the expansion. A US Supreme Court (SCOTUS) decision in 2012, however, gave each state the
option to decide whether to participate in the expansion, without fear of losing their existing
Medicaid funding (NFIB v. Sebelius, 2012). In response, the federal government announced that
they would fully cover the expenses associated with a state expanding for 4 years (through
2016), at which point the federal contribution would begin scaling down to a permanent rate of
90% by the year 2020. This promise of financial support has not been enough to entice many of
the states to participate in the Medicaid expansion. At the time of this writing (April 2018), only
31 states have agreed to the expansion.
The policy decisions made by each state on the Medicaid expansion have had a large
impact the healthcare choices of millions of low-income Americans. Estimates published by the
Kaiser Family Foundation indicate that 15 million Americans have enrolled in their state
Medicaid program thanks to the expansion (“Medicaid Expansion Enrollment,” 2017). This
represents almost 20% of the total national enrollment for Medicaid (ibid). In the non-expansion
states, however, an estimated three million individuals fall within the “Coverage Gap” – those
individuals who make too much money to qualify for Medicaid, but not enough to qualify for
subsidies to purchase private market insurance (ibid).
This research will answer the following questions: What factors operating within a state
were influential in its decision-making on the Medicaid expansion? What lessons might this
experience provide for future federal-state health policy initiatives? This work will build on
current scholarship regarding Medicaid expansion decisions by detailing their history and
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context, investigating conflicting findings within the literature on the topic, and furthering the
existing body of work through the introduction of longitudinal methods of analysis.
Using a discrete-time-logit-model for event history analysis, this work shows that when
expansion decisions are analyzed over time, political factors — namely the political party of the
governor — are the single most significant predictors of expansion decisions. In contrast, factors
related to state-need, which previous research described as being important drivers of expansion
decisions, lack statistical significance when considered in this longitudinal analysis (Henley,
2016). Additionally, this study uncovers evidence that a regional policy diffusion1 effect may be
influencing expansion decisions. These findings improve knowledge of which factors may
prompt future adoptions of the Medicaid expansion and highlight the importance of state-level
politics in the adoption of federal health policy initiative.

1

This effect is evidenced by increases in the percentage of states having previously expanded within a particular
census region, consequently increasing the likelihood that other states in that same region will expand in future timesteps.
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Policy History and Background
What is Medicaid?
Established in 1965 as part of President Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society” initiative,
Medicaid is a public health insurance program dedicated to supporting low-income and
medically needy individuals in covering their healthcare related costs. Initially overshadowed by
the contentious debate surrounding the establishment of Medicare, Medicaid has since grown
into one of the single largest payers in the American healthcare system. In 2016 alone, Medicaid
expenses surpassed $550 billion dollars, nationally (“Federal and State Share of Medicaid,”
2016).
Medicaid was limited in scope at its inception, intended only to be a supplemental
welfare program. However, over the last 50 years, various expansions to the program have
pushed Medicaid into covering more people in need of medical services (Berkowitz, 2005).
Groups such as pregnant women, nursing home patients, children, among others, are now
routinely covered under the program. As a result, in 2017 Medicaid insured roughly 74 million
Americans, or 18% of the country’s population (“September 2017 Medicaid Eligibility,” 2017).
Additionally, state Medicaid programs are now required to help certain hospitals offset the costs
incurred from providing care to disproportionately high numbers of Medicaid and uninsured
patients (“DSH Payments,” 2018). All this to say, Medicaid is a diverse and multi-functional
program that serves as the safety-net for the healthcare coverage of many people and institutions.

Medicaid’s State-Based Administrative Structure
Medicaid features a state-based administrative structure to carry out its mission, rooted to
some extent in initial skepticism regarding the long-term prospects of the program (Engel, 2006).
State-level policymakers and program directors are primarily responsible for defining eligibility
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criteria and benefit packages for enrollees. In contrast, the federal government’s role is to
provide oversight, set minimum standards for eligibility and benefits, and to offer financial
support to the state programs (“Medicaid - An Overview,” 2017). Despite initial trepidation on
the part of some states (most notably, Arizona took 17 years to establish a Medicaid program),
all 50 states now offer a Medicaid program to their residents.
This administrative structure has created a unique and challenging policy making
environment. Prior to the enactment of the ACA, eligibility criteria between state programs often
varied widely. This meant that an individual’s access to healthcare coverage through Medicaid
could be simply the result of living on the “wrong” side of a state border. Furthermore, in many
states, conditions other than income were used to disqualify individuals from enrolling in
Medicaid — for instance, if you were a “childless adult” (“Medicaid - An Overview,” 2017).
Addressing the inconsistency and limitations that pervaded the Medicaid system was a major
target of the ACA (Obama, 2016).

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the Medicaid Expansion
Pursuant to its goals of increasing coverage and access to care while reducing healthcare
related costs for patients, the ACA laid out a “paired approach” to achieving near universal
coverage. As initially conceived in the ACA, Medicaid eligibility was to be expanded across the
country for all citizens with incomes less than 138% of FPL ($16,643) (“US Federal Poverty
Guidelines,” 2018) 2. Furthermore, individuals making between 138-400% of the FPL were to
receive government subsidies to purchase insurance on the private market (Obama, 2016). Most
important, this proposed income cutoff was intended to be the sole criteria for determining
2

The Federal Poverty Level (FPL) is an economic measure that is used to decide whether the income level of an
individual qualifies them for certain federal benefits and programs and is set by the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS). In 2018, the FPL for individuals has been set to $12,140 (“US Federal Poverty Guidelines,”
2018).
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Medicaid eligibility (“Medicaid Expansion & What It Means,” 2018). This expansion, if
implemented by all states, would have meant that an estimated 20 million Americans would
become newly eligible for the Medicaid program (Garfield and Damico, 2017). The full effect of
the expansion on reducing the uninsured rate has not been felt, however, because of difficulties
that have arisen during the implementation phase of the policy making process.

National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius (2012)
The ACA has been a contentious piece of legislation and the subject of a great deal of
litigation. One particularly noteworthy case was National Federation of Independent Businesses
(NFIB) v. Sebelius (2012). In this Supreme Court case, the NFIB (joined by 25 states’ Attorneys
General) sued Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Kathleen Sebelius over the
implementation of the ACA. Specifically, the case hinged on the constitutionality of Congress’s
ability to enforce the individual mandate (requiring the purchase of insurance for all individuals)
and the proposed Medicaid expansion. The plaintiffs challenged that because Medicaid is a stateadministered program, Congress and the administration had overstepped their constitutional
authority by conditioning the receipt of future federal Medicaid dollars on states expanding their
Medicaid programs.
The Court, in a 5-4 decision, generally agreed with the arguments of the plaintiffs and
cited the restrictions placed on Congress as enumerated in the “Spending Clause” 3 of the
Constitution. The Court reasoned that since a state Medicaid program could not continue to

3

Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution reads, “The Congress shall have the Power To lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general
Welfare of the United States....” This clause and powers enumerated therein are collectively referred to as the
Constitution “Spending Clause.” For more information, readers are encouraged to consult the following resource
from the Wex Legal Dictionary operated by Cornell University: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/spending_power
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function if all its federal funding was lost 4, the proposed expansion was “unconstitutionally
coercive to the states” (NFIB v. Sebelius, 2012)5. The Court went on to uphold the
constitutionality of much of the ACA, but the legal challenges did significantly hamper the
implementation of the law’s Medicaid Expansion.

The Medicaid Expansion Post-NFIB
Because of the Court’s decision in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012), each state been able to
decide whether it would participate in the Medicaid expansion program offered by the federal
government, without fear of losing it existing federal funding. Understandably, this decision
removed much of the administration’s leverage in compelling state governments to participate in
the expansion. Difficulties in persuading conservative leaning states to expand were further
exacerbated by the highly politicized nature of the ACA itself (Hall, 2014). To attempt to
overcome resistance to expansion, the federal government offered significant financial subsidies
for the program, allowed states to modify eligibility requirements under a waiver system, and
reduced the income cut-off for the purchase of insurance on the exchange market.
If a state elected to expand their Medicaid program, the federal government agreed to
cover 100% of the costs for new enrollees until December 31, 2016, at which point the federal
contribution would begin scaling back to 90% by 2020 (“Affordable Care Act,” 2016). The
federal government pledged to sustain this level of funding in perpetuity. After some initial
uncertainty, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) also announced that it
4

While exact financial support levels vary between states, the federal government often funds between 50% and
70% of each state’s Medicaid program. The exact share of Medicaid spending that comes from the federal
government is reported in a state’s Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP)– calculated by comparing the
average per-capita income within a state to the average per-capita income nationally, with “poorer” states receiving
more federal support. More information on FMAPs can be found at: https://aspe.hhs.gov/federal-medical-assistancepercentages-or-federal-financial-participation-state-assistance-expenditures
5

For readers interested in the legal arguments used in this case, the following resource developed by Oyez is
recommended: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-393
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would accept Section 1115 waiver expansion proposals. Section 1115 waivers were established
by CMS to encourage and support state innovation in Medicaid and allowed states to participate
in the expansion, but with their own state-specific modifications (such as a work requirement or
imposition of “co-pays” for higher income enrollees). Seven states6 have successfully utilized the
waiver process to expand their Medicaid program. Finally, the federal government reduced the
income cutoff for receiving subsidies to purchase insurance on the private market to 100% of the
federal poverty level in non-expansion states (“Affordable Care Act,” 2016).
Figure (1) below shows the state-by-state decisions that have been made on the Medicaid
expansion. As can be seen below, 24 states have fully adopted the expansion, 7 states have
expanded through a CMS approved waiver, and the 19 remaining states have yet to agree to the
expansion in any form (“Current Status of State Action,” 2017).
Figure 1. Status of State Decisions on the Medicaid Expansion

Image withheld to prevent copyright issues.
Image is viewable in its original publication at
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/slide/current-status-of-the-medicaid-expansion-decision/

Note: This map shows the state-by-state decisions on the Medicaid Expansion. (“Current Status of State Action,” 2017).
6

The seven waiver expansion states are: New Hampshire, Indiana, Michigan, Arkansas, Iowa, Montana, and
Arizona.
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Electing to not participate in the expansion has meant that individuals making between a
state’s existing income eligibility cut off (a median value of 44% of FPL, among non-expansion
states) and 100% of the FPL would not be eligible for Medicaid. These individuals would also
not be eligible to receive federal subsidies to purchase insurance on the private health insurance
exchange markets (“Federal Poverty Level,” 2017). Additionally, failing to expand would allow
provisions within a state that further restricted Medicaid eligibility, generally based on whether
you were a “childless adult” to persist, even if one would otherwise qualify for coverage. The
key point is that a decision to not expand severely restricted the access of low-income
individuals to health coverage and consequently, health care. This phenomenon has been termed
the “Coverage Gap” and affects approximately 3 million people nationally (Garfield, 2016).
Figure (2) below summarizes (for a hypothetical non-expansion state) the different categories in
which an individual could fall (Garfield and Damico, 2017).
Figure 2. Categories of coverage for an average non-expansion state.

Image withheld to prevent copyright issues.
Image is viewable in its original publication at
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expand-medicaid/

Note: This figure summarizes the different coverage levels an individual living in a theoretical non-expansion state could
fall within. (Garfield and Damico, 2017).
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How Does a State Expand Medicaid
Before endeavoring to explain why states expand Medicaid, it is important to first
establish how states could expand their Medicaid programs through the ACA. This is a difficult
question to answer because each state considered the expansion through its own, unique set of
procedures. Most of the 31 expansions have been the result of “normal legislative processes”
whereby the legislature passed a bill7 which the governor then signed (“An Overview of Actions
Taken by State Lawmakers,” 2015). In at least two states (Kentucky and West Virginia),
however, executive action was the mechanism by which the expansion decision was made.
Perhaps out of fear that this type of unilateral action might occur, at least four state legislatures 8
have passed bills requiring that the governor or any other state official receive explicit consent
from the legislature before attempting to expand their state’s Medicaid program (ibid). While the
exact mechanisms for expanding Medicaid are by no means uniform, for the purposes of this
analysis, a state is said to have “expanded” once they have internally resolved to expand their
Medicaid program9. Furthermore, while there are no explicit regulations preventing a state from
“unexpanding” Medicaid 10, no state has thus far made a true attempt at doing so. Given the
number of individual and institutions that have benefited from and rely on the Medicaid
expansion, this researcher contends that it is extremely unlikely that we will observe true
“unexpansion” events in the future.
7

These bills were either stand-alone expansion bills or the language authorizing expansion of Medicaid was
included as part of broader budget legislation.
8

These states include: Tennessee, Georgia, Virginia, and North Carolina.

9

This is often evidenced by the date a bill was signed, and executive order issued, or a state supreme court case
decided.
10

While this researcher could find no laws that explicitly guard against unexpansion, any change in eligibility
criteria would need to be approved by CMS. Furthermore, there has been some debate in Kentucky about “scaling
back” its expansion, however, all that has been done thus far is adding a work requirement for expansion enrollees
(Yetter, 2018).

THE MEDICAID EXPANSION- IMPORTANT FACTORS IN STATE DECISION MAKING

15

Arguments For and Against the Medicaid Expansion
Expansion of Medicaid was and remains an important topic for state policymakers to
consider because it has implications on many aspects of society — from healthcare quality and
access, to workforce productivity, to a state’s budget and relationship with the federal
government. As one might expect, both proponents and opponents of accepting the Medicaid
expansion routinely touch on these topics to justify their positions — often offering conflicting
analyses of the effects expansion would have.
Henninger (2016) provides numerous quotes and excerpts from those arguing for and
against adoption of the expansion. This work reports that arguments offered in opposition to the
Medicaid expansion relied heavily upon the idea that it would “bust state and federal budgets”
and relatedly, that the federal government would not be able to meet its pledged level of financial
support (ibid). In contrast, those supporting the expansion emphasized the potential
improvements to state economies, health outcomes, healthcare expenses, and solvency of rural
hospitals as justification for their position (ibid).
This basic framing of positions can be useful in the initial construction of empirical
models. It is important to note, however, that these are merely the stated reasons used to support
or oppose the expansion. It is plausible that policymakers may be hiding their true motivations
behind what they find to be more politically convenient arguments and talking points. Indeed,
this is exactly what a public choice framework would predict. While proving that disconnect is
likely an impossible task, it is important to be mindful that the stated and revealed (revealed
through empirical modeling and analysis, as this paper will explore) may be divergent.
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Literature Review
Several national studies have been conducted analyzing the consequences of Medicaid
expansion decisions. Most have found that states that have implemented the Medicaid expansion
are observing a reduction in their uninsured population and in the economic burden on families
related to health care costs (Antonisse, Garfield, & Rudowitz, 2017; Kaester, Garrett, & Chen,
2017; Wherry & Miller, 2016). For expansion states, these effects have also been paired with
increases in the utilization of care, healthcare related jobs, and profit revenues for hospitals
(ibid). Consequently, many researchers have argued that expansion has led to an overall net
savings for adopting states (ibid). Despite these reported benefits, however, many states are still
struggling with the decision to expand. Opponents of the expansion routinely cite objections
related to state Medicaid budgets being stretched thin, as well as concerns regarding growing
governmental involvement in healthcare, as justification for their apprehension. Using these
basic arguments as a starting point, several researchers have attempted to understand the
decisions made by state governments on the Medicaid expansion.

Politics as the Main Driver of Medicaid Expansion Decisions
Much of this work has placed an emphasis on the political aspects of the Medicaid
expansion, specifically in regards to electoral ramifications and partisanship. In an article written
for the North Carolina Law Review, Hall (2014) goes so far as to suggest that the true motivation
for rejecting the expansion among non-expanders is “crass partisanship” and political allegiances
to oppose President Obama and Congressional Democrats. In contrast, Barrilleaux and Rainey
(2014) hypothesized that both political and factors related to health deficits and needs (such as
the uninsured rate, poverty rate, etc.) would prove influential in state decision-making. What
they found, however, was that the political party composition of the state legislature held the
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most explanatory power in predicting gubernatorial support for the Medicaid expansion (ibid).
Furthermore, they concluded that need-based metrics had only minimal effects on expansion
decisions (ibid).
Other research, focusing on electoral posturing, has echoed the conclusion that politics is
the main predictor of expansion decisions. Using a mixed-method approach, one paper found
that governors opted for Medicaid expansion decisions in instances that positively affected their
prospects at re-election (Flagg, 2014). This is further supported by the work of Henninger (2016)
— who conducted a case study of five southern Republican governors who stood for re-election
following the NFIB v. Sebelius (2012) decision. Henninger (2016) argued that the Republican
governors he studied were reluctant to support the Medicaid expansion because they faced
tougher challenges from conservative opponents in their primaries than from Democrats in the
general elections. Thus, to avoid encouraging a challenge from within their own party, the
governors shied away from expansion (ibid).
Finally, Hall (2018) examined the oft-used claim that Medicaid expansion has “busted
state budgets.” Citing reports published by the National Council of State Budget Officers, Hall
finds this argument deficient, as the Medicaid expansion has not resulted in significant spending
increases among states that expanded (ibid). This work suggests, at least in Hall’s view, that
states that have not expanded have failed to expand more out of ideological objections than for
evidence-based reasons (ibid).

Other Factors as Drivers of Medicaid Expansion Decisions
In contrast, Jacobs and Callaghan (2014) approached the analysis of expansion decisions
in a novel manner. Instead of treating the expansion decision as a simple binary choice (e.g.
expansion vs. no expansion), they conceptualized state decisions as simply being on “differing
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degrees of implementation.” Their argument for using this “process approach” was that by
forcing states into limited and rigid categories, important information about the relative progress
on implementation that states have made with the expansion is lost (ibid). The authors posit that
just because two states are both classified as “non-expanders,” that does not mean they have
handled the Medicaid expansion in the same way. Furthermore, such states should not be
analyzed as though all non-expansion decisions were monolithically motivated and static. Using
this framework, they concluded that although political variables did appear to hold the most
explanatory power, the possibility remained that partisanship is “an obstacle, rather than a death
sentence” and need-based factors may later emerge as equally important in motivating
expansions of Medicaid (Jacobs and Callaghan, 2013). Taking this argument as a starting point,
recent research has found that examining explanatory models (political, economic, etc.) in
isolation suggests that the political model does have the most predictive power.

When

explanatory models are integrated into a single, unified model with variables competing against
and controlling for each other, however, factors related to state-need11 and health status emerge
as the strongest drivers of expansion decisions (Henley, 2016).
In addition to its conceptual contributions to the study of the Medicaid expansion, these
findings indicate that previous research may have omitted variable bias. When the incorporation
of new variables markedly changes the results of a regression, that is evidence that the initial
regression was incorrectly specified (Lee, 1982). If present, this type of bias is particularly
troublesome as it affects the estimates of variable coefficients (ibid). Although removing all of
the omitted variable bias from a model is often more of an aspiration than a practical reality, the
divergent findings in the literature provide evidence that such an issue needs to be addressed.

11

This is measured by the uninsured rate, the poverty rate, and the portion of a state’s population over the age
of 65.
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Understanding the Divergence in the Literature
Recent work suggests that the cause of expansions may not be limited to simple political
maneuvering and instead involves more complex and dynamic decision-making. This complexity
needs to be modeled to better understand state decisions on the Medicaid expansion that have
already been made, and more importantly to more clearly define the environments that are
conducive to future expansions. That is the objective of this research.
The majority of previous work in this space is cross-sectional and attempts to explain
Medicaid expansion decisions based on a single year of observation, usually 2012. These types
of studies are often ill-suited to modeling dynamic and complex environments, such as the ones
observed with the Medicaid expansion. In addition, these type of models fail to account for
expansions that have occurred in recent years, do not take into account the influence that the
passage of time may be exerting on the policymaking environment, and neglect trends in
identified factors that might help explain expansion decisions. Finally, cross-sectional studies run
the risk of misattributing the effects that “system shocks” 12 have on the dependent variable to the
explanatory variables.
For these reasons, previous research may suffer from methodological issues that
adversely affect the accuracy and robustness of findings. The divergent findings in the literature
could also be explained by these modeling choices. Improved methods of modeling Medicaid
expansion decisions should be explored. That is what current research endeavors to accomplish.

12

The idea behind a “system shock” is that some unexpected or unpredictable event affects the system being
studied, either in a positive or negative way. If unaccounted for or unmitigated, their effect on the outcome of
interest can be caught in the explanatory variables specified -- leading to potentially misleading conclusions about
the effect of the independent variables to be drawn.
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Contributions to the Existing Literature of this Study
Much of the previous literature has highlighted the need for time-varying analyses to be
conducted (Henley, 2016; Jacobs and Callaghan, 2013). Until this point, such studies have not
been possible because enough time had not passed since expansion decisions were able to be
made. Five full years have now elapsed since the NFIB decision. Consequently, there is now
sufficient data to make a longitudinal study possible. Conducting such a study mitigates many of
the modeling problems previously described in the existing literature, as will be explained in
subsequent section of this paper. Thus, this work fills a void in the literature and offers a new
method for analyzing state Medicaid expansion decisions. By accomplishing this aim, this
research contributes to the larger debate on the Medicaid expansion and provides clarity to the
existing literature regarding what factors are motivating expansion decisions.
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Data and Methods
Numerous explanations for Medicaid expansion decisions have been scrutinized by
previous researchers. The methods used, however, have not been able to account for more recent
expansions and such analyses do not consider the influence of time. Time is an important factor
to incorporate in my study as its progression can allow for the policy-making process to more
fully play out, as well as for changes to occur within a state which may affect its propensity to
expand. Thus, I conclude that it is appropriate for me to feature a time-variant approach to
studying Medicaid expansion decisions, in lieu of an OLS 13 or other cross-sectional method, as a
unique and important contribution to the literature.

Description of Data
As mentioned previously, past researchers have published their work on Medicaid
expansion decisions and routinely feature the same basic set of variables and factors. These
generally include data on gubernatorial party affiliation, the uninsured rate, federal aid for state
Medicaid programs, etc. (Henley, 2016; Jacobs and Callaghan, 2013; Barilleaux and Rainey,
2014). For this reason, it seems appropriate that I adopt many of those same measures for my
own analysis. This will create consistency between my paper and previous scholarship.
I will use the variables identified by Henley’s research as my starting point. Henley’s
(2016) research begins with a replication analysis 14 of previous papers and offers a representative
set of variables for what has been used by other researchers. The data points featured in my
analysis are drawn primarily from resources published by: The Department of Health and Human
13

OLS stands for Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression and is a commonly used method for analyzing the
marginal effect that a covariate has on a dependent variable. This models are powerful in certain contexts, but illsuited to deal with time-series and panel data (Cox, 1972).
14

This is a type of analysis whereby the research attempts to replicate the work of past researchers in order to
confirm findings and prove competency at performing different data manipulations.
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Services, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, National Council of State
Legislatures, and the Center for Disease Control. I also intend to introduce several new variables
to the model, namely: President Obama’s approval rating within the state and the state’s
Medicaid spending growth rate, among others15.
There is one other critical distinction in the data I intend to use, as opposed to the data
used in most of the literature, that should be disclosed. I have collected values for the variables
listed in Appendix A for each year in the 2012 to 2016 timeframe, in annual intervals beginning
on June 28, 2012 (the day NFIB v. Sebelius was decided). This will generate panel data16, which
is associated with greater statistical power and will allow for the incorporation of time-varying
covariates in the model, satisfying the stated aims of this research.
Finally, for reasons that will be explained in the subsequent section, the data must be
restructured into a state-period (also known as a “person-period”)17 data file. This involves
expanding the times and censor indicators (yi, si) to a sequence of binary responses, yti. The yti
term will indicate whether the state expanded Medicaid during a particular time interval. By
doing this, the 50 observation data set (50 states) is expanded into a 250 line data set (50 states
over 5 years), with the associated covariates for each entry. Next, all the observations for states
in the time-steps after they had expanded must be removed (Steele, 2005). This is done because
expansion of Medicaid through the ACA, for the purposes of this analysis, is treated as a non-

15

In total, 35 variables have been collected across five broad categories of expansion decision motivators: Political,
economic and budgeting, state-need and health status, regional diffusion, and past history with Medicaid innovation.
A full variable codebook can be found in Appendix A.
16

Panel data is defined as a “longitudinal data set that follows a given sample of individuals over time, and thus
provides multiple observations on each individual in the sample” (Hurlin, 2010). Whenever research subjects are
observed at more than one point in time, the data can be described as panel data.
17

This type of data file is arranged by giving every observation (state) a separate entry for each time-interval (year)
it is under study (has not expanded Medicaid). For example, the state of Tennessee would have separate entries for
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 instead of simply one entry, containing the data for each year.
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repeatable event. Observations were then right-censored if they failed to expand by the end of the
study time (June 28, 2012 to June 27, 2017). Adopting these approaches guards against biasing
the “expanding” or “non-expanding” outcomes with misleading or endogenous observations.
This reduces the final data set to 151 state-period observations containing 31 positive event
indicators (yti ) — one for each state that expanded, in the time period that it expanded.

Model Specification
The specific type of investigative model that most appropriately satisfies the constraints
of my data is an Event History Analysis (EHA). EHA is a term commonly used to describe “a
variety of statistical methods that are designed to describe, explain or predict the occurrence of
events” (Allison, 2004). Within EHA, however, there are two distinct modes of analysis:
Continuous-Time-Models (CTM) and Discrete-Time-Models (DTM). Each of these flavors of
EHA comes with its own set of basic assumptions regarding the data and underlying
relationships that may be present. Thus, it is worthwhile to consider the merits of both, before
committing to one method.

Continuous-Time-Models (CTM)
Continuous Time Models are used to characterize events, where those in the risk
pool are vulnerable to experience the event at any time from the start of their observation
until either the study ends or they exit the study population. An important feature of
CTM’s is that the timing of the event for each subject is recorded precisely when it occur,
on a continuous time scale (Steele, 2005). Most commonly, CTMs are executed using a
Cox-Proportional-Hazards-Model (ibid).
In this model, a set of covariates are analyzed to determine how they impact the
‘survival’ of an observation. Essentially, the Cox model analyzes how the identified
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factors impact how long it takes for the event of interest to occur. It accomplishes this
objective by generating what are known as hazard ratios. Hazard ratios can be
understood as the ‘hazard’ (or risk) of experiencing an event for a given observation in
the treatment group, at the next time step of the analysis, compared to the control group
(ibid).
These models, as the name implies, also rely on the assumption of proportionality
to function optimally. Put simply, this model assumes that over the course of time, the
relative effect of each covariate on the dependent variable is unchanging. If, however, it
is found that a variable (for example, party of the governor) is more influential at the
occurrence of an event (expanding Medicaid) than at early time intervals, then the
proportionality assumption is said to be violated. Finally, because time is measured
continuously, these models function best when there are no tied failures 18 in the data
(Borucka, 2014).
I have concerns regarding the appropriateness of this type of model for my
analysis. This apprehension is based in the fact that my data are collected in annual
intervals rather than continuously19, there are multiple ‘tied failures’ in the dataset, and I
am skeptical that the proportionality assumption will hold true 20. Thus, while CTMs
18

In survival analysis, a ‘failure’ is not inherently bad and instead indicates that the event of interest has occurred.
For example, when a state expands Medicaid it is said to have “failed.” Thus, “tied failures” is a phrase used to
describe the instance where multiple observations (states) in the data set experience failures/events (expanding
Medicaid) at the same moment in (study) time.
19

A state that expands on August 1, 2013 is not treated differently than a state that expands on August 2, 2013 or
even January 1, 2014. ‘Years’ are indexed to begin and end on the anniversary of the decision being issued in NFIB
v. Sebelius – June 28, 2012. The study time extends over 5 time intervals, concluding on June 27, 2017 (the 2016
time step).
20

The Jacobs and Callaghan (2014) paper argues that while politically based factors are important early on, that
state-need factors may emerge as being drivers of later expansions. If this is true, it would be a blatant violation of
the proportionality assumption and as such, I think skepticism regarding the proportional effect of the covariates
over time is well-founded.
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generally accomplish what this research aims to do, the assumptions and mathematics
associated with such an approach may not be well tailored to addressing the identified
research question, given the collected data. Consequently, other models should be
explored.

Discrete-Time-Model (DTM)
In contrast to Continuous-Time-Models, Discrete-Time-Models (DTMs) utilize
data that is retrospectively collected in regular intervals. Whereas CTMs can distinguish
between events based on the precise time in which they occur, discrete time models
group all the events that happen within a given interval of time together (intervalcensored). This is precisely how the data for this analysis has been collected (annual
intervals).
Considering the underlying assumptions inherent to DTMs is the next critical step
to evaluating the appropriateness of this model. The DTM has no requirements in terms
of proportionality, unlike the Cox model (Steele, 2005). In addition, the semi-parametric
nature of the DTM indicates that it makes no assumptions regarding the baseline hazard
function21, allowing the analyst to specify the baseline hazard (Turner, Batchelor, &
Firth, 2010). Further, the model easily incorporates time-varying covariates and righthand censoring22 of data (Steele, 2005).
A key distinction to make between DTMs and CTMs is that while CTMs generate
hazard ratios, DTMs generate odds ratios using a logistic regression (logit) estimators
(Steele, 2005). An odds ratio represents the odds that an event will occur given a
21
22

The baseline hazard function is the hazard function when all covariates have values of “0” or the ‘base value’

Observations are said to be ‘right censored’ if they do experience the event of interest by the conclusion of the
analysis, or they drop out of the study population prior to both the conclusion of the study and experiencing the
event.
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particular status, compared to the odds of that same event occurring in the absence of that
status (Szumilas, 2010). This allows the analyst to generate results and interpretations
like: “The odds of an event occurring are X times greater for observations with Y as
opposed to those in the ‘reference group’23.” In other words, I will be able to say, “For a
state picked at random, the odds of expanding Medicaid are X times what they are if a
state has Y compared to if that same state were in the ‘reference group’.”
Thus, I conclude that the discrete-time-logit-model is the appropriate method for this
analysis to adopt. I have arrived at this conclusion because the data for this analysis has been
collected in discrete time intervals (annual), I have reservations as to whether the proportionality
assumption would hold true based on suggestions from previous literature, and the interpretation
of results are more easily applied to my research question. The precise method by which a
discrete-time-logit-model should be executed will be the focus of the remainder of this section.

Exploration of Hazard and Survival Functions
The first step in completing an event history analysis is to construct a life-table (Steele,
2015). Life-tables are a succinct and clear way to summarize how many events occur at a given
time interval and calculate the hazard and survivor rates. The life-table for Medicaid expansion
decisions is provided below in table (1). The event is said to have occurred (or “failed”) when a
state internally resolves to expand its Medicaid program.

23

For instance, if “Democratic governor” is specified as the reference group, the odds ratio allows you to compare
the odds of expanding Medicaid with a Republican or Independent governor relative to the odds of expanding with a
Democratic governor.
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t
(time-step)
1 (2012-2013)
2 (2013-2014)
3 (2014-2015)
4 (2015-2016)
5 (2016-2017)

Table 1. Medicaid Expansion Life-Table
rt
dt
wt
ht
(# at risk)
(# of events)
(# censored)
(hazard rate)
50
13
0
0.26
37
13
0
0.351
24
3
0
0.125
21
2
0
0.095
24
19
0
19
0
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st
(survivor rate)
1
0.74
0.48
0.42
0.38

t = time interval (annual interval, beginning on June 28 of each year - the anniversary of the NFIB v. Sebelius decision);
rt = Number of states remaining at risk at the start of the interval;
dt = Number of events occurring during that time-step;
wt = Number of censored individuals;
ht = Hazard function for time step (ratio of the number of events to the number of individuals at risk in that time interval,
adjusted for censoring);
st = Survivor function for time step (the probability that an observation 'survives' to that time-step)

Inspection of the hazard (ht) and survivor (st) functions yield insightful information. It
appears that after time-period two, there is a marked decrease in the hazard rate — indicating
that most states that opted to expand Medicaid did so quickly. The rate of failures then decreases
dramatically, with no failures observed in the final time-step among the 19 remaining states. The
survivor function decreases exactly as we would expect.

Methodology
Fitting a binary response model (discrete-time-logit model) using the Stata program is
now possible. A population averaged estimator 25 will be used to calculate coefficients and
standard errors for each variable, as the small number of observations and variability in the
dataset precludes the usage of fixed or random effects. Before any of this occurs, however, the

24

This represents that 19 states that did not expand Medicaid. They are “right-censored” at this time step because
the study time has elapsed and they have not yet expanded Medicaid (they have yet to experience a “failure”).
25

The population averaged estimator is a way in which the odds ratios can be computed across all observations in
the data set, with the average result reported. This is in contrast to a clustered approach (which when modeled,
would not converge), where the odds ratios reported would be unique to each individual state. Population averaged
odds ratios can also be understood as the odds ratios for a state “picked at random” (Sribney, 2018).
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dataset must first be declared as a panel dataset with state ID declared as the panel variable and
year declared as the time variable.
The final regression equation specified by Henley (2016) will serve as the starting point
for this analysis. Doing so will allow for a clear distinction to be drawn between the results of
this longitudinal analysis and the results of previously published cross-sectional methodologies 26.
A series of refinements to the model will then be explored — attempting to most correctly model
Medicaid expansion decisions. Both the original and refined models will be evaluated for
validity and goodness of fit by generating predicted outcomes (e.g. whether a state expanded) for
each observation and then comparing those results to the actual outcomes. The two models will
be compared directly using a proportional-reduction-in-error methodology27.
Upon completing the numerical analysis component of the project, interpretations of the
regression outputs will then be generated that read in the general form: For a state picked at
random, the odds of expanding Medicaid with [X] are [exp(β)] times the odds of expanding with
[reference group]. This will allow for the creation of an “expansion profile” that will more
clearly identify the factors conducive to adopting the Medicaid expansion.

26

Due to page and time restrictions (and after consultation with research advisors), I will not carry out an exact
replication of Henley’s (2016) cross-sectional work. Instead, I will immediately begin with the longitudinal analysis,
but use the final set of explanatory variables Henley (2016) specified as the initial model.
27

The proportional reduction in error is a method for quantifying the increased precision associated with predicting
a dependent variable when a set of independent variables are specified.
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Data Analysis
The data set was converted into a state-period file and specified as a panel data set, with
state ID designated as the panel variable and year set as the time variable. The outcome of
interest is whether a state opts to expand Medicaid during a given time-step. If a state expands,
its event variable is given a value of 1 for that interval and subsequent observations of that state
during future time periods are dropped. If a state does not expand during a given time step, event
is given a value of 0. As these possible outcomes are discrete and binary in nature, logistic
regression is employed. For a particular variable to be considered statistically significant, it must
achieve significance at the 95% confidence level (p-value < .05).

Output from the Initial Model
To begin the analysis, the final equation specified by Henley (2016) is taken as a starting
point. As a reminder, a full variable codebook can be found in Appendix A. The initial
regression equation is reported below (see equation 1):

Equation 1. Initial Logit Regression
𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒊𝒕(𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅𝑴𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒊𝒅)
= 𝜶 + 𝟏 𝑮𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒐𝒓𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚 + 𝟐 𝑭𝑴𝑨𝑷 + 𝟑 𝑷𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆
+ 𝟒 𝑬𝒍𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒍𝒚𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆 + 𝟓 𝑼𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒅𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆 + 𝟔 𝑯𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒕𝒉𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒔
+ 𝟔 𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑶𝒇𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 + 𝟕 𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝑳𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒔𝑺𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑳𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒕𝒉
A logit model was fitted to the state-period data file, using covariates found in equation (1) and a
population-averaged estimator. Odds ratios were generated for each covariate from this
regression and the results can be seen in table (2) below.
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Table 2. Regression Output from Model 1
Model 1
OR
Variables

Robust
SE

Z

95% C.I.

Governor Party
Independent

.554

.72

-0.45

.043-7.07

Republican

.102

.063

-3.69***

.031-.344

FMAP Ratio

.944

0.39

-1.39

.871-1.02

Poverty Rate

1.12

.138

0.93

.880-1.43

Elderly Rate

.887

.116

-0.91

.687-1.15

Uninsured Rate

1.05

.082

0.58

.898-1.22

Health Status

1.11

.139

0.81

.865-1.42

% of Region Expanded

1.04

.017

2.57**

1.01-1.08

Average Legis. Session

1.01

.006

1.17

.996-1.02

(Constant)

.267

.952

-0.37

.000-289

Model χ 2

30.65**

Note: *p < .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Using the odds-ratio precludes a direct comparison to previous research (which analyzed
marginal effects), however, these results are intriguing in the context of previous research. The
party affiliation of the governor retains its significance. The odds for a state picked at random of
expanding Medicaid with a Republican governor are 1/10 of what they are if that state had a
Democratic governor (p-value of 0.000), holding the other included variables constant. Thus, we
would expect to see states that are “on the fence” on the question of the expansion most likely
opt to expand if a Democratic governor were to replace a Republican. Indeed, this is precisely
what happened with Louisiana in 2016. In fact, the state decided to expand Medicaid less than a
week after Governor Bel Edwards (Democrat) replaced Governor Jindal (Republican)
(O’Donoghue, 2017).
More interestingly, the factors related to state-need (poverty rate, size of elderly
population, uninsured rate) that Henley (2016) reported as being significant, no longer appear to
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be so when expansion decisions are considered with this time-variant methodology. The only
other variable reporting statistical significance is the regional diffusion variable, measured by the
percentage of a state’s Census region (South, West, Northeast, Midwest) that had expanded
Medicaid at the start of a particular time-step. Based on these results, the odds of expanding for a
state picked at random are 1.8 times higher for each one standard deviation increase in the
percentage of “peer region states” having previously expanded (p-value of 0.01), holding all else
constant. Previous cross-sectional research had reported that the geography of a state and policy
diffusion had no statistically significant effect on expansion decisions (Henley, 2016).

Initial Model Diagnostics
Predicted outcomes were generated for each observation in the state-period data set,
using a linear prediction of the logit index. The initial model correctly predicts the outcome, for a
given state in a given period, 84% of the time (127 of 151 total observations). This corresponds
to a proportional reduction in error (PRE) of 22.58%.
It is worth nothing that when the scope of analysis is limited to the “censoring time
interval” — the time-step in which a state either opts to expand or the study time elapses
(representing the state’s ultimate decision) — the model is correct in only 66% of cases (33 of 50
cases). Specifically, 15 of the 31 (48%) expansions were correctly predicted as well as 18 of the
19 (95%) of the non-expansion events. This demonstrates that the initial model does a good job
at predicting non-expansion, but performs only moderately well in terms of predicting
expansions. Consequently, model refinement should focus on better predicting the occurrence of
expansions.
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Output of the Refined Model
Because the initial regression equation is the product of previous research and does
accurately predict a fair number of cases in the 151 observation data set, those covariates will be
retained in the refined model. Based on statements made by lawmakers about the size and
importance of Medicaid budgets, however, I posit that including information about Medicaid
spending trends will improve the model’s accuracy. Pursuant to such, the refined model will
include data about the spending growth rate between years for each state, as well as the
proportion of a state’s budget that is consumed by its Medicaid program.
Additionally, I contend that President Obama’s popularity in a state may be a strong
predictor of expansion decisions. The ACA was very closely attached to the President himself, so
much so that the legislation is often referred to simply as “Obamacare.” In fact, polling of the
ACA’s popularity has reported marked differences 28 in the popularity of the law based on
whether it was referred to as “the Affordable Care Act” or “Obamacare.” (Bryan, 2017). Lastly,
a variable that reports the party controlling the state legislature will be introduced. This is done
to create a more representative picture of the political dynamics within a given state —
particularly in light of the importance that state legislatures had in the decision making process
on the Medicaid expansion, as previously described.
Given these amendments to the original model, the refined model (seen below in equation
2) now takes the form of:

28

One study found that 46% of respondents disagreed with “Obamacare” but that number dropped to 40% when
respondents were asked if they approved or disapproved of the Affordable Care Act (Bryan, 2017).
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Equation 2. Refined Logit Model
𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒊𝒕(𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅𝑴𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒊𝒅)
= 𝜶 + 𝟏 𝑮𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒐𝒓𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚 + 𝟐 𝑭𝑴𝑨𝑷 + 𝟑 𝑷𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒚𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆
+ 𝟒 𝑬𝒍𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒍𝒚𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆 + 𝟓 𝑼𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒅𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆 + 𝟔 𝑯𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒕𝒉𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒔
+ 𝟔 𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑶𝒇𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒅 + 𝟕 𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝑳𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒔𝑺𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑳𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒕𝒉
+ 𝟖 𝑴𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒊𝒅𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝑮𝒓𝒘𝒕𝒉𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆 + 𝟗 𝑷𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑶𝒇𝑩𝒖𝒅𝒈𝑶𝒏𝑴𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒊𝒅
+ 𝟏𝟎 𝑶𝒃𝒂𝒎𝒂𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒂𝒍𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆 + 𝟏𝟏 𝑳𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
An identical method of analysis is used for this model as was done previously. The odds ratios
for the covariates in this model are reported below in table (3).
Table 3. Odds Ratios of Refined Regression
Model 2
OR

Variables

Robust
SE

Z

95% C.I.

Governor Party
Independent
Republican

.704
.137

.855
.087

-0.29
-3.13**

.065-7.60
.039-.477

FMAP Ratio

.978

.043

-0.49

.897-1.07

Poverty Rate
Elderly Rate
Uninsured Rate
Health Status
% of Region Expanded
Average Legis. Session
Medicaid Spending Growth
Medicaid budget %

1.10
.807
1.04
1.18
1.06
1.00
1.04
.966

.149
.124
.097
.153
0.23
.006
.026
.050

0.73
-1.39
0.39
1.27
2.69**
0.88
1.55
-0.67

.846-1.43
.597-1.09
.863-1.25
.914-1.52
1.02-1.10
.993-1.02
.989-1.09
.873-1.07

Obama Approval Rating

1.06

0.57

1.06

.952-1.18

Split

1.02

.944

0.981

.167-6.25

Republican

.297

.254

-1.42

.055-1.59

.007

.041

-0.84

.000-742

Legislative Party

(Constant)
Model χ

2

44.41***

Note: *p < .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

As before, the party of the governor has a strong and statistically significant effect on the
outcome of interest. The odds of a state picked at random deciding to expand Medicaid are 0.13
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times what they are with Republican governor as compared to a Democratic governor (p-value
0.002), holding all other included variables constant. Also as before, the “state-need” variables
identified by Henley (2016) are not statistically significant. The percentage of states within a
census region that had previously expanded remains a statistically significant predictor of
expansion decisions for states in that region. In this iteration of the model, however, the odds of a
state picked at random expanding Medicaid are 2.1 (compared to 1.8) times higher for each
standard deviation increase in the percentage of peer-region states expanding, holding all else
constant.
Additionally, the variables that were added in this refined model were found to not be
statistically significant predictors of expansion decisions. This included the Medicaid spending
growth rate, the percentage of a state’s budget dedicated to Medicaid spending, the political party
composition of the state’s legislature, and President Obama’s approval rating within the state.
These results are surprising, however, it is important to investigate whether the inclusion of these
variables improves the overall performance of the model.

Refined Model Diagnostics
As was done previously, predicted outcomes are generated for each observation in the
state-period data set. The refined model correctly predicts the outcome, for a given state in a
given period, 89% of the time. This is an improvement upon the 84% accuracy rate of the initial
model. Further, the proportional reduction in error is 45.16% for the refined model — a marked
improvement upon the initial model’s value of 22.58%. These findings support the conclusion
that the refined model is an improvement upon the initial model, at least in terms of its predictive
power.

THE MEDICAID EXPANSION- IMPORTANT FACTORS IN STATE DECISION MAKING

35

Additionally, when restricting the scope of the analysis to the censoring time interval as
was done with the initial model, the number of correctly predicted states increases from 33 to
3629. The model accurately predicts 17 total expansion events, compared to the actual value of
31. This is an improvement upon the initial model which accurately predicted only 15 expansion
events. Additionally, the refined model accurately predicts all 19 non-expansions — compared
to the 18 so predicted by the initial model. Consequently, there are 14 remaining cases 30 in which
the refined model made an inaccurate prediction of non-expansion when an expansion did in-fact
occur. A full listing of the states and their predicted outcomes from each model is provided
below in Table (4).

29

The refined model correctly predicts the outcome for Missouri, New Jersey, Nevada, and West Virginia whereas
the initial model did not. The refined model does, however, incorrectly predict the outcome for Montana, which the
initial model correctly predicted as an expansion.
30

Those states are: Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, North Dakota, New Mexico, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Most of these states are either “waiver expansion”
states or expanded Medicaid during the first time-step (June 28, 2012 to June 27, 2013).
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Table (4). State by State Predicted Outcomes for Each Model
State

Actual
Outcome

Model 1
Prediction

Model 2
Prediction

State

Actual
Outcome

Model 1
Prediction

Alaska

Expand

Expand

Expand

Montana

Expand

Expand

Alabama

No
Expansion

No
Expansion

No
Expansion

No
Expansion

Arkansas

Expand

Expand

Expand

North
Carolina
North
Dakota

Arizona

Expand

No
expansion

No
expansion

Nebraska

No
Expansion

No
Expansion
No
Expansion
No
Expansion

Model 2
Prediction
No
expansion
No
Expansion
No
Expansion
No
Expansion

California

Expand

Expand

Expand

New
Hampshire

Expand

Expand

Expand

Colorado

Expand

Expand

Expand

New Jersey

Expand

Connecticut

Expand

Expand

Expand

Nevada

Expand

No
expansion
No
expansion

No
expansion
No
expansion
No
expansion
No
expansion

New Mexico

Delaware

No
expansion
No
expansion
No
expansion
No
expansion

New York

Expand

Ohio

Expand

Hawaii

Expand

Expand

Expand

Oklahoma

Iowa

Expand

No
expansion
No
expansion
Expand
No
expansion
No
expansion

Florida
Georgia

No
expansion
No
expansion
No
expansion

No
expansion

Expand

Expand

No
Expansion

No
expansion
No
Expansion

No
expansion
No
Expansion

Oregon

Expand

Expand

Expand

Pennsylvania

Expand

Rhode Island
South
Carolina
South
Dakota

Expand
No
Expansion
No
Expansion
No
Expansion
No
Expansion
No
Expansion
No
Expansion

No
expansion
Expand
No
Expansion
No
Expansion
No
Expansion
No
Expansion
No
Expansion
No
Expansion

No
expansion
Expand
No
Expansion
No
Expansion
No
Expansion
No
Expansion
No
Expansion
No
Expansion

Vermont

Expand

Expand

Expand

Washington

Expand

Expand

Expand

Wisconsin

No
Expansion

No
Expansion

West
Virginia

Expand

Wyoming

No
Expansion

No
Expansion
No
expansion
No
Expansion

Illinois

No
expansion
Expand

Indiana

Expand

Kansas

No
expansion

No
expansion
No
expansion
Expand
No
expansion
No
expansion

Kentucky

Expand

Expand

Expand

Tennessee

Louisiana

Expand

No
expansion

No
expansion

Texas

Massachusetts

Expand

Expand

Expand

Utah

Maryland

Expand

Maine

No
expansion

Michigan

Expand

Minnesota

Expand

No
expansion
No
expansion
No
expansion
No
expansion

No
expansion
No
expansion
No
expansion
No
expansion
No
expansion
No
expansion

Idaho

Missouri
Mississippi

No
expansion
No
expansion

Expand
No
expansion

Expand

Virginia

Expand

Expand

Expand
No
Expansion
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The newly added variables were investigated to determine the robustness of their effects.
Individually removing each of the four newly added variables prompts a dip in accuracy of more
than 3%, except for the variable which reports the percentage of a state’s budget consumed by
Medicaid spending. The effect of excluding that variable from the regression was to decrease the
model’s accuracy by just 1%.
One interaction effect was investigated. It was thought that interacting the variables
reporting the political party of the governor and state legislature could produce a more accurate
view of the political environment within a state. However, including this interaction reduces the
accuracy of the model by 2%. Consequently, it is determined that this interaction term does not
improve the performance of this particular model and should not be included.
Finally, it should be noted that the refined model contains a number of “precise zeros.”
These are variables that have odds ratios and associated confidence intervals that are tightly
centered around 1 — indicating they have little to no effect on the odds of a state expanding
Medicaid. These include the Medicaid spending growth rate in a state from one year to the next,
as well as the average length (days per year) of the state’s legislative session.
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Conclusion

Summary of Results and Findings
This analysis introduced a new method for studying Medicaid expansion decisions,
through use of a discrete-time-logit model. This research has built upon previous cross-sectional
work by allowing for the incorporation of time-varying covariates and panel data into the
empirical analysis of Medicaid expansion decisions. Results from the regressions run are largely
supportive of the hypothesis that the political party affiliation of the governor is a strong
determinant of expansion decisions — in some instances, reducing the odds of expansion to as
little as a tenth of what they would be otherwise. While stating the magnitude of this effect in
this manner is novel, conceptually it fits well within the existing framework of what state-level
factors were conducive to expanding Medicaid. Additionally, when moving from a crosssectional to longitudinal study, the factors related to “state-need” that were previously reported
as being statistically significant drivers of expansion decisions lose that quality (Henley, 2016).
As a further contribution to the literature, for the first time, there is evidence that a
“regional diffusion” effect for Medicaid expansion decisions might be present. A standard
deviation increase in the percentage of states within a census region having previously expanded
doubled the odds that another (randomly picked) state in that same region would then expanded.
Additionally, including information related to President Obama’s approval rating, the political
composition of the state legislature, and the Medicaid budget significantly improved the
predictive performance of models previously specified in the literature – despite the fact that
these variables lacked statistical significance on their own.
In sum, the results of this analysis mostly support the conclusions reached by past
researchers (Barilleux and Rainey, 2014; Hall, 2014; Jacobs and Callaghan, 2013). The findings

THE MEDICAID EXPANSION- IMPORTANT FACTORS IN STATE DECISION MAKING

39

of this work are that while Medicaid expansion is certainly an issue that touches on many aspects
of society, from an empirical standpoint, politics appears to be the main motivator of expansion
decisions — at least at this stage of the policy making process. With that said, states may also be
susceptible to “peer pressure” to expand and while factors related to state-need and health status
may lack individual significance, they are important control variables and should not be wholly
dismissed.

Limitations of Study
There are several important limitations to this study that should be noted. The choice of a
given model and set of covariates is an important decision each researcher must make, but one
must also entertain the possibility that alternative pathways might exist. While I advocate
strongly for the further inclusion of longitudinal methods of analysis in this space, I offer very
little in the way of nuanced variable manipulation in this paper. The results of this study should
serve merely as a starting point for future researchers to consider other variables and methods
that could explain expansion decisions.
Additionally, there is a strong argument to be made for the notion that expanding
Medicaid through a CMS approved section 1115 waiver (as 7 states did) is a fundamentally
different choice than expanding through the conventional pathway. Waiver expansion may
present as a compelling path by which future expansions may occur, particularly to states with
more conservative tendencies. This analysis makes no distinction between waiver and
conventional expansions.
One other limitations to this study has to do with “common shocks.” If for instance, all
“early expanders” opted to expand for the same reason at the same time, the model would not be
able to pick up on these non-independent changes. Indeed, the model poorly identifies early
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expanders of Medicaid. This could be the result of a “common shock” and/or the fact that no data
was incorporated into the model before the first time-interval. Perhaps including a “0 time step”,
measuring variable values in the year before expansion decisions could first be made, might
improve the predictive power of the model in terms of correctly identifying early expanders.
Furthermore, this analysis should not be interpreted as giving guidance on how expansion
has or may occur in any particular state. Rather, this reported results of this work merely
constructed a generalized profile of what conditions in a state picked at random would be most
conducive to expansion of Medicaid. This is a subtle but important difference, as every state has
its own unique history and goals and must decide how Medicaid expansion fits within its
particular priorities. I will discuss in the Future Research section though, one way in which
specific state-level conclusions could be drawn from this work.
There is also an important issue to be considered with any state level analysis in regards
to sample size. With only 50 states and 31 expansion events, even when the data is expanded into
a state-period file over 5 years, there is only a small amount of variability in the data. This
condition can make it difficult for models to report statistical significance or feature clustered
analysis techniques. As such, the findings from this work should not be taken as causes of
Medicaid expansion, rather as a set of conditions that are well correlated with expansion.
This is particularly true of the effect observed with the PercentRegionExpanded variable.
No causal mechanism is evaluated to explain why the actions of other states within a census
region should impact the decision-making of a state still evaluating the expansion. In truth, there
are likely omitted variables whose effects are being “caught up” in this measure and contributing
to its size and impact. Nevertheless, it is plausible that a regional diffusion effect may be
working via non-expansion states having to reconcile their decisions against the improved
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outcomes observed in “peer-states” that did opt to expand Medicaid. However, this idea is
merely a hypothesis and was not evaluated in this analysis.
Furthermore, the usage of census region boundaries is admittedly, a bit of an arbitrary
choice for classifying states. Under this framework, states that border each other may not be
allowed to “interact” with one another – even though a state could “interact” with some other
state that is several hundred miles away. For example, Tennessee (South) and Missouri
(Midwest) share a border but are in different census regions. Meanwhile, Tennessee and Florida
are separated by the entirety of the state of Georgia, but only Florida’s expansion decision – not
Missouri’s – could influence Tennessee’s expansion decision, based on how this variable was
created. This is preferable still to constructing the variable to be based on the percentage of
boarding states that had previously expanded – because some states have 0 (Alaska and Hawaii)
bordering states while others have up to 8 (Tennessee and Missouri). The point being, there is a
great degree of difficulty in identifying a regional variable that creates an accurate picture of
policy diffusion and it is certainly a limitation of this study.

Policy Implications
The results of this study have several important implications for the future of the
Medicaid expansion and public health policy. Namely, any attempt at the crafting of federal
health policy must be mindful of state level politics. As the saying goes, “all politics are local.”
Thus, proponents of the Medicaid expansion in current non-expansion states may benefit from
changing their strategy from advocating for expansion to instead creating political environments
that are conducive to expansion. This approach, coupled with the regional diffusion effect
observed, could push some of the 19 states that have not yet expanded towards doing so.
Additionally, it appears that emphasizing factors related to state-need as justification for
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expansion may not be as compelling as one might think. Perhaps, pro and anti-Medicaid
expansion groups should devote more money towards gubernatorial races than to issue advocacy,
to more effectively achieve their aims.
In that spirit, in November of 2018, 36 gubernatorial seats will be up for election. This
includes governorships in 14 of the 19 non-expansion states (all of which are currently held by
Republicans)31. Of these, according to Real Clear Politics, 12 of these states are likely to stay in
Republican control, while Florida is classified as a toss-up and Maine32 as a likely win for
Democrats (“Latest Election Polls,” 2018). If the Democratic candidate were to win these races,
particularly in Maine, we would likely see a few more expansions occur. Furthermore, as of
April 2018, the state of Virginia appears to be closing in on a deal to expand Medicaid. If
Virginia (who flipped from a Republican to a Democratic governor in November of 2017) were
to expand and Florida elected a Democratic governor that expanded Medicaid, we may expect
that other southern states (most of the current non-expansions states) – through the regional
diffusion effect detailed previously – may soon follow suit.
Finally, this work further underscore the point that making profound changes to the
Medicaid program and the US health system in general, is an extremely challenging prospect.
This is based in no small part to the diverse set of stakeholders and policymakers that often have
divergent interests, but each leverage considerable influence in state decision making.
Nevertheless, continued interest in the Medicaid expansion among proponents in non-expansion
states will likely keep the debate on this issue running for the foreseeable future.

31

These states include: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
32

Maine approved a public referendum by 58.9% to 41.1% margin in December of 2017. However, despite this
vote, Republican Governor Paul LePage has stated he does not intended to expand Medicaid and has taken no action
in the direction of expansion.
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Recommendations for Future Research
Future research should continue using longitudinal methods of analysis in studying the
Medicaid expansion. As time goes on, more data will become available and more observations
generated - hopefully serving to clear up what types of factors are driving Medicaid expansion
decisions. This is important work because it is entirely possible that as time goes on, the
Medicaid expansion might become less politically charged and the reasons for future expansions
may differ markedly from those we have seen thus far.
Looking at the 14 expansion events that the model incorrectly predicted suggests that
there may still be omitted variables that if included, would be able to capture these expansions.
Among the incorrectly predicted states, many are waiver expansion states and/or early
expanders. Better characterizing these expansions should certainly be a next-step for subsequent
research. It would be also prudent for future research to distinguish between waiver and
conventional expansions by implementing relative-risk models and to investigate how the
method of expansion (legislation, executive action, public referendum, etc.) changes the odds
ratios of the explanatory variables. This type of information would be extremely helpful to
political strategists who aspire to see more states expand Medicaid.
One other future research direction would be to use qualitative analysis of state lawmaker
statements/speeches/bills to compare stated rationales for expansion with these quantitative
results. It would also be intriguing to see whether the state policymakers leading this debate (in
either direction) eventually left their positions for careers in national politics or the health
insurance industry. Any of these areas of research would be worthwhile to pursue and I intend to
support those efforts by making my dataset publicly available via TRACE.
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Appendix A – Variable Code Book
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------id_c
Unique state ID code
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------type: numeric (long)
label: id_c
range: [1,50]
unique values: 50
examples:
22
32
42

units: 1
missing .: 0/151

12 IA
MI
NM
TN

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------expansionstatus_c
Whether the state expanded by end of study
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------type: numeric (long)
label: expansionstatus_c
range: [1,3]
unique values: 3
tabulation: Freq.
95
42
14

units: 1
missing .: 0/151
Numeric Label
1 No
2 Yes
3 Yes (waiver)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------year
Year (time-period) under consideration. Indexed to June 28.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------type: numeric (int)
range: [2012,2016]
unique values: 5
tabulation: Freq. Value
50 2012
37 2013
24 2014
21 2015
19 2016

units: 1
missing .: 0/151

51

THE MEDICAID EXPANSION- IMPORTANT FACTORS IN STATE DECISION MAKING

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------event
Binary value indicating whether a state expanded in that year
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------type: numeric (byte)
range: [0,1]
unique values: 2

units: 1
missing .: 0/151

tabulation: Freq. Value
120 0
31 1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------region_c
What census region the state is categorized in.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------type: numeric (long)
label: region_c
range: [1,4]
unique values: 4
tabulation: Freq.
38
20
60
33

units: 1
missing .: 0/151
Numeric Label
1 Midwest
2 Northeast
3 South
4 West

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------sesslength
Average length of regular state legislative session, 2011-2014.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------type: numeric (float)
range: [45.5,516.88]
unique values: 47

units: .00001
missing .: 0/151

mean: 126.54
std. dev: 53.593
percentiles:
10%
25%
50%
75%
90%
75.26 89.5 127.8 148.5 185.245
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------perbudgmedicaid
Percent of state budget spent on Medicaid
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------type: numeric (float)
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range: [7,37.2]
unique values: 107

units: .1
missing .: 0/151

mean: 23.2391
std. dev: 6.6374
percentiles:
15.9

10%
25%
50%
18.5 23.4 27.8

75%
32

90%

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------medicaidspendgrwthrate
Percent change in total medicaid spending from previous year
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------type: numeric (float)
range: [-46.6,24.1]
unique values: 108

units: .1
missing .: 0/151

mean: 3.69934
std. dev: 7.94481
percentiles:
-3.3

10%
.5

25%
4.1

50%
75%
7.5 11.2

90%

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------fmap
Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) for that year
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------type: numeric (float)
range: [50,74.199997]
unique values: 92

units: 1.000e-06
missing .: 0/151

mean: 60.3682
std. dev: 7.57515
percentiles:
50

10%
25%
53.3
61

50%
66.3

75%
70.6

90%

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------poverty
State poverty rate for that year
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------type: numeric (float)
range: [8.7,24.2]
unique values: 81
mean: 14.8768
std. dev: 3.11336

units: .1
missing .: 0/151
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percentiles:
11.1

10%
25%
50%
12.4 14.6
17

75%
19

90%

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------unemp
State unemployment rate for that year
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------type: numeric (float)
range: [2.8,10.4]
unique values: 60

units: .1
missing .: 1/151

mean: 6.14467
std. dev: 1.71157
percentiles:
4

10%
4.8

25%
6.05

50%
7.4

75%
8.5

90%

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------uninsured
State's uninsured rate for that year
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------type: numeric (float)
range: [3.6,28.1]
unique values: 96

units: .1
missing .: 0/151

mean: 12.2828
std. dev: 3.88573
percentiles:
8.5

10%
25%
9.6 11.8

50%
14.4

75%
16.9

90%

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------disabilityprev
State's prevalance of disabilities for that year
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------type: numeric (float)
range: [9.3,18.6]
unique values: 65

units: .1
missing .: 0/151

mean: 13.1331
std. dev: 1.97267
percentiles:
10.7

10%
25%
50%
11.7 12.9 14.5

75%
16.1

90%

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------perelderly
Percent of the state's population classified as elderly.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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type: numeric (float)
range: [8,21]
unique values: 12

units: 1.000e-06
missing .: 0/151

mean: 14.2384
std. dev: 1.9586
percentiles:
12

10%
25%
13
14

50%
15

75%
16

90%

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------budgpercap
Size of state's budgetary expenditures, per capita
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------type: numeric (float)
range: [760,18644]
unique values: 150

units: .0001
missing .: 0/151

mean: 5987.89
std. dev: 2731.5
percentiles:

10%
25%
50%
75%
90%
3965 4492 5296.6 6320.97 8252.61

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------healthstatus
Percent of population rating themselves as 'poor or fair' health
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------type: numeric (float)
range: [11.7,25.200001]
unique values: 85

units: 1.000e-06
missing .: 0/151

mean:
17.3
std. dev: 3.23617
percentiles:
13.4

10%
25%
50%
14.8 16.9 19.3

75%
22.2

90%

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------percentregionexpanded
Percent of peer states expanding at that time within census region
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------type: numeric (float)
range: [16.666668,88.888893]
units: 1.000e-06
unique values: 13
missing .: 0/151
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mean: 43.611
std. dev: 19.5459
percentiles:
10%
25%
50%
75%
90%
22.2222 31.25 37.5 58.3333 76.9231
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------obamaapp
Pres. Obama's approval percentage for that year
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------type: numeric (byte)
range: [19,64]
unique values: 38

units: 1
missing .: 0/151

mean: 41.9536
std. dev: 8.50281
percentiles:
32

10%
25%
36
42

50%
47

75%
54

90%

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------govparty_c
Party controlling the governor's position
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------type: numeric (long)
label: govparty_c
range: [1,3]
unique values: 3

units: 1
missing .: 0/151

tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label
38
1 Democrat
2
2 Independent
111
3 Republican
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------legisparty_c
Party controlling state legislature
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------type: numeric (long)
label: legisparty_c
range: [1,3]
unique values: 3
tabulation: Freq.
57
83
11

units: 1
missing .: 0/151
Numeric Label
1 Democrat
2 Republican
3 Split
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